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Abstract
Separatists about grounding take explanations to be separate from their corresponding grounding-facts.
Grounding-facts are supposed to underlie, or back, such explanations. However, the backing relation hasn’t
received much attention in the literature. The aim of this paper is to provide an informative definition of
backing. First, I examine two prominent proposals: backing as explaining (Kovacs 2017; 2019a) and backing
as grounding (see SjölinWirling 2020). Finally, I put forward my own proposal. I argue that under plausible
assumptions about the role of backing and the nature of explanation, backing should be understood as a
form of truthmaking, minimally construed.
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1. Introduction
Grounding is a worldly noncausal determination relation that is widely thought to be linked with a
particular kind of noncausal explanation.1 Typical examples of grounding-facts include mental
states being grounded in their physical features, chairs by their constituents, and sets by their
instances. Unionists about grounding take grounding-facts to be identical to their corresponding
explanations. Separatists, on the other hand, argue that explanations are distinct from grounding-
facts: grounding-facts underlie, or back, explanations (Raven 2015).2 Explanations of the form ‘A
explains B’ are backed by facts of the form [A grounds B].3 Still, the backing relation has not received
much attention in the literature. The aim of this paper is to provide an informative definition of
backing.
Why is this important? First, the backing-locution appears in many contexts other than the
grounding literature. For example, causal or constitutive explanations are said to be backed in an
analogous manner but, again, backing-talk is left unspecified.4 Providing a unified account of
backing would allow us to make sense of backing-talk across many different contexts. Secondly,
separatists are at a disadvantage in comparison to unionists when they cannot specify what
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1These explanations are usually called metaphysical explanations (Fine 2012). Spelling out the nature of metaphysical
explanations is hard and a matter of ongoing discussion (see, e.g., A. Wilson 2020). In the context of this paper, I will treat
metaphysical explanations as species of noncausal explanations (perhaps they are noncausal explanations that are of some
particular interest to metaphysicians). I will also take ‘explanation’ to refer to noncausal explanation unless stated otherwise.
2Proponents of separatism include Schaffer (2016) and J. Wilson (2016). On the unionist camp we could include Rosen
(2010), Fine (2012), and Litland (2018a) (still, see fn. 5).
3For readability, I assume that grounding and explanation-claims involve one-to-one relations. This is unusual. Most
grounding theorists take the grounding relation to be many-to-one (Bliss and Trogdon 2016) (cf. Litland 2016).
4See e.g., Kim (1988, 226; 1994, 58, 60, 67), Ruben (1990, 232), Glennan (2002, 342).
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backing-talk is supposed to designate. If we expect to do any sort of progress vis-à-vis the
unionism/separatism debate, we should know more about what backing is supposed to be.5
Finally, a definition of backing might be important for functionalist theories of grounding. Such
theories do not define grounding in terms of their first-order formal features but in terms of
their functional role. The most obvious role that grounding relations can play is their ability to
back noncausal explanations (Rettler 2017). A primitive or unspecified notion of backing would
count significantly against such views.
In section 2, I propose and motivate some constraints about the nature of backing. In section 3
and 4, I examine two prominent proposals: backing as explaining (B=E) and backing as grounding
(B=G). In short, I argue that both (B=E) and (B=G) generate more questions than they answer. In
section 5, I put forward my own proposal. Briefly, I argue that under plausible assumptions about
the role of backing and the nature of explanation, backing should be understood as truthmaking,
minimally construed. Finally, I tackle some objections.
2. Platitudes about backing
Separatism is the view that explanations are separate from the facts that make them obtain. In this
sense, separatism is a minimal thesis (although some of its versions might be more plausible than
others).6 Still, since the focus of this paper is the backing relation that obtains between these two
separated entities, I will bring up plausible features of separatism that are relevant to my discussion
when appropriate.
In this section, I will propose a functional definition of backing based on minimal assumptions
about its nature. Then, I will clarify and motivate these features, thus showing that they can act as
prior constraints for any proposed theory of backing. The functional characterization I want to
propose is the following:
(Functional) [A grounds B] (G) backs ‘A explains B’ (E), iff, there is a relation R with the
following features:
(1) R holds nontrivially between G and E,
(2) R is cross-categorical, and,
(3) R’s obtaining (at least partially) makes it the case that E’s success conditions are met.
A couple of specifications are in order. First, the nontriviality clause makes sure that relations such
as ‘being in the same world as’ do not come out as backing relations. Secondly, the success
conditions of an explanation are those conditions that, once they are met, necessitate that the
explanation is successful.When a grounding-fact backs an explanation, then that fact contributes to
the satisfaction of the success conditions of that explanation.7 Thirdly, this characterization involves
5Two clarifications. First, I do not wish to imply that an informative definition of backing would settle the debate. It could be
that there are independent reasons for why someone should be a separatist (Maurin 2019, 20). Still, the question about the
nature of backing plays a significant dialectical role in the relevant debate (see, e.g., Wallner [2021, 3]). Secondly, I am also
assuming that the separatism/unionism debate is a substantial one. For the view that the debate is largely verbal see Dasgupta
(2017, 94 fn. 8), Skiles and Trogdon (2019, 160), and Kovacs (2019a, 4). Note that if it turns out that unionists also need to
countenance a backing relation, then they would also need to provide an account of backing.
6Sjölin Wirling (2020, 2–3) takes separatism to be primarily driven by the idea that explanation necessarily involves some
epistemic or pragmatic dimension. But unionists also recognize that feature and actively try to accommodate it, either by
adopting some nonmonotonicity clause or by countenancing multiple (often primitive) grounding relations (e.g., Litland
2018b).
7Of course, I do not need to commit to the view that a given grounding-fact is sufficient for the relevant success conditions to
be fully met. Perhaps, there are facts other than grounding-facts (e.g., pragmatic/epistemic facts as per Sjölin Wirling [2020,
2–3, 5]), which are also necessary. Or, it could be that grounding-facts are sufficient on their own given that the relevant
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grounding-facts but there is no reason to think that it cannot be extended to other kinds of facts as
well.8 I begin my discussion by focusing on grounding since backing has received attention
primarily in the context of grounding (Raven 2015; Schaffer 2016). Even though, as mentioned,
the backing-locution can also be found in other domains, it is fair to expect that the main source of
my audience are people interested in grounding.9 Finally, I take backing to be cross-categorical in
the sense that backers (in this case, grounding-facts) are different in kind from the explanations they
back. This is perhaps the most contentious proposed feature of backing and for this reason it
requires further discussion.
Why think that backing is cross-categorical? First, I take cross-categoricity to be a default feature
of backing. Taking at face value the way the term backing is used in the literature entails that backing
is cross-categorical. Grounding-facts are taken to be worldly and broadly stance independent,
whereas explanations are about such facts (thus, representational in character). This is particularly
salient if one considers the relation between causal events and the explanations which they back. As
Schaffer (2016, 36) puts it:
[O]ne wants to distinguish between causation—a concrete relation in the world—and causal
explanation—an abstract pattern over facts or sentences. And one wants to connect these
notions by allowing causal relations in the world to back causal explanations among facts or
sentences. Or so orthodoxy has it, and so I take for granted here.
Secondly, it is independently plausible that explanations are ontologically different from their
backers. Consider causation again. Causal explanations are apt to pragmatic/epistemic constraints
whereas the causal relation itself typically is not.10 To compare, separatists about grounding make
analogous remarks (Sjölin Wirling 2020, 2–3). In this sense, it is no accident that separatists about
grounding model their view according to the relation between causation and causal explanation.
There are ways to resist the cross-categoricity of backing. Sjölin Wirling (2020, 4, 5, 6), in an
interesting move, argues that explanations are not the proper kind of relatum for the backing
relation. Rather, she argues, a grounding-fact like [A grounds B] backs the fact that ‘A explains B’ is
an explanation. In other words, backers back the explanatoriness of that which represents them. In
this sense, backing is not cross-categorical since both of its relata are facts.
It could be argued that one can translate explanation-talk into fact-talk: saying ‘a grounding-fact
G backs an explanation E’ can be translated into ‘G backs the fact that E is an explanation.’ But it is
unclear if one should do so. First, translating talk of one ontological category to another does not
come for free. To compare, consider operator-based views of grounding being translated into
relational-talk. This is certainly possible, but one would need to make some substantive ontological
assumptions along the way (i.e., countenancing a relation of grounding). In this sense, it is unclear if
the results of such translation procedures can be trusted. More importantly, it seems to me that the
explanation ‘A explains B’ and the fact that ‘A explains B’ is an explanation are importantly different
pragmatic/epistemic conditions are built into the relevant grounding-fact (e.g., by taking grounding to be a quaternary relation
ranging over contrast classes).
8The standard view is that explanations are backed by determination-facts (broadly construed) (see Taylor [2018]). But there
might be other ways to back an explanation. For example, Lange (2016) claims that some explanations are distinctively modal
(in cases were the explanandum holds with a weaker modality than the explanans). Glazier (2020) also mentions explanations
backed by nomic facts. Kovacs (2019a, sec. 4.3; 2019b) argues that noncausal explanations are backed holistically. deRosset
(2013, 12) takes explanations to be backed by arguments. Taylor (2020) has also argued that there is room for an antirealist
version of backing.
9I will transition to a more generalized conception of separatism when dialectically appropriate (e.g., secs. 4, 5, 7; see also
fn. 8).
10The point that causal explanation and causation are significantly different kinds of entities goes all the way back to
Davidson (1967). Still, there are unorthodox exceptions (cf. Kim 1981).
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entities. The former is an explanation, whereas the latter is a fact about that explanation. To my
mind, backing concerns the former.
Identifying the facts that determine the fact that ‘A explains B’ is an explanation is an interesting
(albeit different) question. There are two versions of this question. The first reading concerns the
fact that ‘A explains B’ is a successful explanation (Sjölin Wirling [2020, 4] seems to adopt this
reading). But this fact is not “backed” in the original sense. Rather, it holds in virtue of the fact that
‘A explains B’ is fully backed (in the sense that its success conditions are fully met). The second
reading concerns the fact that ‘A explains B’ is an explanation (successful or not). I cannot settle this
question here, but I am inclined to think that facts about the explanatoriness of a putative
explanation are grounded in certain of its structural features. For example, on Kim’s proposal
(1994), explanations are propositions that have three “slots”: one for the explanans (or explanantia),
one for the explanandum, and one for the determination-relation that connects the underlying
phenomena (more on this later). At any rate, I take the question concerning the nature of the
relations that are involved in these two readings to be an open question (and distinct from the issue
concerning the nature of backing).
Finally, it could be argued that even if Sjölin Wirling is wrong about the exact details of the
explanation-relatum, backing is still monocategorical in the following sense (bracketing translat-
ability worries): backing could be the relation between the fact that A grounds B and the fact that A
explains B.11
I have the following response. The cross-categoricity of backing should be understood in a
general, nonfetishistic, way. A relation is cross-categorical when it relates entities that are impor-
tantly different from one another, even if those entities belong (strictly speaking) to the same
ontological category. As noted, grounding relations are worldly items whereas explanations are
representational entities about those items. In this sense, even if explanations are facts, the kinds of
facts that they are differ significantly from the kinds of facts that grounding-facts are.12
2.a On the nature of explanations
(Functional) in its current state is nontrivial but not very informative. Its content will becomemore
determined once we answer the following question:What sort of entity is an explanation? There are
two plausible types of answers to this question. The first view takes explanations to be vessels that
report or represent determination-facts. For example, some take explanations to be arguments
(Kitcher 1989) or sets of propositions (Kim 1994). Alternatively, according to the so-called ontic
conception, explanations are determination-facts themselves. In this sense, explanations are (quite
literally) discovered in the same way causal events are discovered.13
11It could be suggested that given that grounding and explanation typically relate facts, we can infer that backing relates facts.
I have two responses. First, this inference can be doubted: backing doesn’t relate the relata of a given explanation but that
explanation as a whole. To compare, explanations might relate propositions, but it doesn’t follow that explanations are
propositions themselves.They could, for example, be arguments as per Hempel (1965). Secondly, we should resist the claim that
explanation relates facts. Bracketing controversial views, standard accounts in the literature take the relevant relata of
explanation to be sets of interpreted sentences (Kitcher 1989) or constituents of propositions (Kim 1994). The so-called ontic
view of explanationmight be a plausible candidate for the view that the relata of the explanation-relation are facts (in saying this,
I assume that such facts would beworldly in the same way the typical relata of the grounding relation are). Still, as it will become
apparent, the ontic view is incompatible with separatism (see sec. 2.a).
12To compare, the monocategoricity of explanation goes beyond the sameness in the ontological category of its relata. Take
the classic Hempel view (1965) according to which an explanation is a relation between a set of sentences involving reference to
a law of nature, and a sentence having a nomologically expected state as its content. Both relata occupy the same ontological
category, while also being importantly similar: they both have a representational function vis-à-vis the phenomenon under
examination.
13Conceptions of explanations should be distinguished from theories of explanation (Bokulich 2016, 263; Wright and van
Eck 2018, 998). Theories propose a model of how explanations are supposed to work (e.g., law-based theories, à la Hempel, take
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The ontic conception cannot accommodate the cross-categoricity of backing and is incompatible
with separatism. According to the ontic view, the explanation of B in terms of A is identical to a fact
like A grounds B. If explanations just are determination-facts, then there is nothing separating them
from those very determination-facts. So, it seems that the ontic view is a unionist-friendly account.
Instead, the thesis that we should plug in to (Functional) to get amore substantive account is the one
that identifies explanations with vessels that have some sort of representational or reporting
capacity.14
Simply saying that explanations are vessels that report determination-facts does not get us very
far since this idea can be cashed out in many different ways. For example, explanations could be
arguments, sets of propositions, models, or something along those lines. Still, I think there is a way
forward by taking explanations to be sets of propositions. This is not a costly assumption. For one, it
is not clear that the competitors of such a view have anything more to offer in terms of features. The
only contestable feature I can think of concerns the datum thatmany explanations are complex. The
view that takes explanations to be arguments can accommodate this datum rather naturally. An
argument can have many different premises each capturing a different kind of explanans: singular
causes, background conditions, laws of nature, etc. But I see no reason why the explanations-as-
propositions view cannot deliver the same result. Propositions can be complex or structured too.
3. Backing as explaining
So, what would the relation between an explanation and its backer be? The first proposal I will
examine has been advanced by Kovacs (2017, 2934; 2019a, 6) who identifies “backing” with
“explaining”:
(B=E) [A grounds B] backs ‘A explains B,’ iff, [A grounds B] explains ‘A explains B.”15
For example, according to (B=E), an explanation of a specificmental state in virtue of a brain state is
explained by the fact that the latter grounds the former.
I have two worries against this proposal. The first worry concerns the cross-categoricity of
backing. As mentioned, the grounding separatist view does not simply claim that explanations are
distinct from their corresponding grounding-facts. Specifically, the claim is that explanations are
separate from grounding-facts and different in kind. But (B=E) cannot accommodate this datum. I
take it that the explanation-relation obtains between the explanandum and the relevant explanans
(or explanantia). In this sense, every theory of explanation takes explanations to relate the same
kind of entities. As mentioned, some views take explanations to be arguments: explanantia and
explananda are both propositions or sets of sentences (Kitcher 1989). Others take the explanation-
relation to be a connective: explanantia and explananda are nonreified, linguistic, entities
reference to laws to be a constitutive feature of explanations). Conceptions, on the other hand, concern the metaphysics of
explanations (i.e., what explanations are in the most literal sense). For interpretative issues see Craver (2019).
14For this reason, we can reject Glazier’s (2020, 125) recent proposal that backing is a version of the part-whole relation. If
explanations were themselves worldly facts, then it could (perhaps) be said that an instance of a determination relation literally
composes an explanation. But this view does not seem to deliver the right results once one understands explanations as vessels
that report. It is a categorymistake to claim that instances of determination-relations are literally proper parts of the entities that
represent them.
15Kovacs cites Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005, 28) and Schnieder (2010, 326–28) as others who share this view. But it is not so clear
from these passages that they do. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005, 18) takes explanations to be truth-apt and backing to be a form of
primitive grounding. But primitive grounding is arguably distinct from the explanation-relation unless one is a unionist about
grounding in this latter instance (which is bizarre and unmotivated). Similarly, Schnieder’s view is that backing is grounding,
but grounding is construed as a connective and not as a reified relation (2010, 327; see alsoMacBride [2020, sec. 3.5]). I consider
backing-as-grounding in the next section.
Backing as Truthmaking 5
(Schnieder 2010).16 Or, perhaps, explanations are relations between worldly items as per the
so-called ontic conception of explanation.17 No theory of explanation, which I know of, takes
(or can take) the explanation-relation to be cross-categorical.18
My second worry against (B=E) appeals to a particular version of the separatist view. If the
separatist view is that every successful explanation is backed, and if to be backed is to be explained,
then we get the following thesis:
(Explanation Maximalism) Every successful explanation is explained.
But (ExplanationMaximalism) leads to a regress since it requires the existence of an infinite series of
explanations.
The proponent of (B=E) might respond by saying that the resulting regress is benign. But this
move does not come cheap. First, it is not that clear what counts as a vicious regress. Some believe
that vicious regresses are regresses that have some specific structural feature. Others disagree and
take viciousness to be context relative. So, it seems that in order for the proponent of (B=E) to claim
that the relevant regress is benign, additional (and controversial) assumptions about the nature of
regresses must be made.19 Secondly, even if we accept that (Explanation Maximalism) leads to a
benign regress, it is still the case that (B=E) has to countenance a regress. And even benign regresses
have implications for one’s ontology. Specifically, (Explanation Maximalism) leads to the existence
of infinite explanations. This is still a cost for (B=E).20
The obviousmove for the proponent of (B=E) would be to reject (ExplanationMaximalism) and
claim that only some successful explanations are explained. Such a view is entailed by the weaker
separatist view that only some successful explanations are backed. This move avoids the regress
worry. It does so, however, at a significant cost. Again, more questions are raised. Which
explanations are not backed? And (once we identify them), why is it the case that these explanations
are as such that they do not require a backer? Again, I take these questions to not have obvious or
easy answers.21
16One might worry that some representational accounts of explanation are cross-categorical. For example, a model of some
phenomenon (a representation) would, presumably, explain that very phenomenon (a worldly entity). This is false. A model
involves an explanandum and some explanantia in the same way an explanatory proposition or an explanatory argument does.
In this sense, the explanation relation obtains between those entities (which, in turn, are literally components of that model); not
between the explanation and the phenomenon itself.
17I addressed the ontic conception in the previous section.
18Sjölin Wirling (2020, 7) prefers an interpretation of (B=E) according to which the relevant ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ of identity.
Rather, the slogan “backing is explanation” should be read elliptically as the claim that the backing relation is explanatory. But
this, in turn, is compatible with the claim that such explanations are underwritten by some other relation (with which backing
would be identical). I agree that the explanatoriness of backing can be cashed out in this way (I return to this point in section 7).
But Kovacs’s view is that backing is literally the explanation-relation. After all, this is what allows him to respond to one version
of themeta-grounding problem (i.e., the problem of what explains facts of the form: [A explains B]) in a new and interesting way
(2019a, sec. 4.3.).
19Themost straightforward way of doing this would involve claiming that a regress is benign in virtue of its objective features
and showing that (Explanation Maximalism) leads to a regress with such features. Alternatively, one could adopt a context-
relative account of benign regresses and claim that (ExplanationMaximalism) leads to a benign regress in the relevant contexts.
For example, Maurin (2013) argues that a series is vicious insofar as the task that that series was supposed to fulfil isn’t met. So,
now the question arises: what kind of task is a second-order explanation supposed to fulfill? Again, this indicates that, either
way, the proponent of (B=E) needs to do a lot of additional work in order to claim that (Explanation Maximalism) leads to a
benign regress.
20Of course, evaluating the severity of such a cost requires further assumptions about the relevant metric of parsimony. Also,
it is worthmentioning that Kovacs, in other work, accepts that countenancing regresses (regardless of their form) counts against
a theory (2019b, 7–8).
21Note that the issue here concerns successful explanations in particular, as per (Explanation Maximalism). Separatism
should allow for unbacked unsuccessful explanations.
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Finally, and perhaps more importantly, accepting that only some explanations are explained
requires the existence of successful but unbacked (or bare) explanations (bare explanations,
henceforth). Bareness should be distinguished from fundamentality. An explanation can be
fundamental but still backed in the sense that it holds in virtue of a fundamental fact. Bare
explanations, on the other hand, are “naked”: they do not hold in virtue of anything else. Some
successful explanations would have to be unbacked for the regress worry to be avoided.
Bare explanations are controversial in themselves but, more importantly, they seem to be in
tension with separatism. This is a significant cost for (B=E). Separatism wants to capture the
intuition that successful explanations are higher-order, macro, phenomena that do not “float-free.”
Bare explanations go against this intuition. To be clear, I am not claiming that the existence of bare
explanations is incompatiblewith separatism. If separatism is construedminimally as the thesis that
explanations are separate from their backers, then bare explanations do not pose a threat (brack-
eting their controversial nature). My point is that positing successful unbacked explanations is in
tension with a philosophically attractive version of separatism. Such a view would say that every
successful explanation is backed, in the sameway physicalists say that every state is nothing over and
above a physical state. In this sense, proponents of (B=E) who wish to argue that only some
successful explanations are explained need to adopt an unattractive version of separatism.22
4. Backing as grounding
The natural alternative to (B=E) is the view that backing is a form of grounding. As previously
noted, explanations hold in virtue of the facts that back them. Since in-virtue-of talk and priority-
talk are often taken to be indicators for the existence of grounding relations, backing-as-grounding
is a view that deserves consideration:
(B=G) [A grounds B] backs ‘A explains B,’ iff, [A grounds B] grounds ‘A explains B.’
Saying that the explanation of a mental state in terms of its corresponding brain state is backed by
the relevant grounding-fact means that the former is grounded by the latter. Still, the proponent of
(B=G) needs to do a lot of additional work in order to make (B=G) an illuminating definition of
backing.
Before critically evaluating (B=G), I shouldmake the following clarification. Themost developed
version of (B=G) has been recently proposed by Sjölin Wirling (2020).23 However, her account is
different frommy understanding of (B=G) in two ways. First, as already noted, she takes backing to
relate facts of the form [A grounds B] with facts concerning the explanatoriness of the proposition
‘A explains B.’ Secondly, she defines backing as partial grounding.
I have addressed the first point in section 2. Concerning the second point, I agree with Sjölin
Wirling that if backing is a form of grounding, then grounding-facts partially ground their
corresponding explanations.24 It is plausible that for an explanation’s success conditions to be
fulfilled certain epistemic/pragmatic conditions should also be in place (in addition to the relevant
grounding-facts). But I see no reason to insist that the first relatum of backing should always be a
grounding-fact. In this sense, these epistemic/pragmatic conditions would also be partial grounds.
22The proponent of (B=E) would need to show in what way, if any, the principle that every explanation is backed should be
rejected. So far, I have argued that the rejection of that principle generates more questions than it answers. Also, a
philosophically attractive version of separatism takes every successful explanation to be backed. In this sense, it is not just
that backing has some pretheoretical content that puts pressure on (B=E). There are also philosophical reasons to prefer a
notion of backing with the features I have highlighted.
23J. Wilson (2016), Thompson (2018), and Kovacs (2019a) also consider (B=G).
24Naturally, Sjölin Wirling would frame things using her preferred backing relatum (i.e., facts about the explanatoriness of
propositions instead of explanations themselves). Still, my formulations are dialectically acceptable since I take the claim that
backing is partial grounding to be largely orthogonal to whether backing relates explanations or facts about such explanations.
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And such conditions together with the relevant grounding-fact would fully ground the relevant
explanation. In this sense, backing can’t be defined as partial grounding since there are clear
instances of backing being underwritten by full grounding relations (i.e., the ones involving the
conjunction of a grounding-fact with its appropriate epistemic/pragmatic conditions).25
That being said, I take these two differences to not be particularly important. The core of Sjölin
Wirling’s theory (i.e., that backing is a form of grounding) is independent from these auxiliary
assumptions and deserves serious consideration. Also, as it will become apparent, the challenges I
will raise against (B=G) also apply to Sjölin Wirling’s specific view. For this reason, my focus on
(B=G) is dialectically acceptable.
Appeals to grounding can be understood in many ways. I will divide them into two groups:
reductive and nonreductive accounts. The nonreductive view takes grounding to be primitive (Audi
2012). Proponents of this view argue that grounding resists analysis but is still a valuable
metaphysical tool. Perhaps the most important merit of this view is that it can accommodate the
thesis that every successful explanation is backed without generating a regress. The resulting picture
would simply be the view that every successful explanation is grounded.
Still, nonreductive versions of (B=G) have an important shortcoming: they are uninformative.
First, if grounding is primitive and backing is a form of grounding, then (B=G) simply collapses to
the view that backing is ultimately unanalyzable.26 In this sense, it simply is not illuminating enough
to say that backing is a form of grounding. Instead, we should prefer views which reduce backing to
more familiar phenomena. Secondly, the grounding literature is still relatively young in comparison
to other literatures. This unsurprisingly leads to a lack of consensus concerningmany of the features
of grounding (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015). In this sense, it would be better to appeal to a less
controversial entity when we wish to define backing.
At this point it could be objected that, for separatists, the existence of grounding is already
assumed. In this sense, separatists would not take grounding to be unfamiliar. This is certainly true
for some separatists. But, as noted in section 1, backing is a phenomenon that appears in other
domains as well (e.g., causal explanation). One needn’t believe in the existence of grounding in
order to be a separatist. In this sense, a separatist about causal explanation who is also a grounding-
skeptic would find (B=G) unconvincing.
Finally, another way to illustrate the fact that (B=G) is uninformative is by considering that a
characterization of grounding in terms of backingwould be explanatorily underwhelming.27 Even if
one does not aim to define grounding in terms of its backing role toward explanation, it would be
nice to be able to characterize grounding in terms of its function. Grounding is the relation that,
among other things, backs explanations. If backing is a form of grounding, then that way of
illuminating grounding would not be available anymore.
I should note that I agree with Sjölin Wirling (2020, 7) that a circular characterization of
grounding is permissible. She presents the following case: the property of being a blood relative is
realized by the property of parenthood. But it is plausible that in characterizing blood relatedness,
one would refer to the property of parenthood. Indeed, it would not “obstruct understanding”
(SjölinWirling [2020, 7]; my emphasis) to say that grounding is that which grounds certain kinds of
25The point that such epistemic/pragmatic conditions are partial grounds is in line Sjölin Wirling’s own remarks (2020, 5).
Still, it could be argued that even if such conditions are partial grounds, they should not be understood as backers of the relevant
explanation (the same worry might also apply to the conjunction of these conditions and the relevant grounding-fact).
Presumably this is because the first relatum of backing is supposed to be restricted to grounding-facts or determination-
facts broadly construed. But, again, I do not see the motivation for this restriction.
26Of course, taking backing itself to be primitive is different from taking backing to reduce to grounding and then taking
grounding to be primitive. In the latter instance, backing reduces to something ‘more familiar’which, among other things, has a
primitive nature. In this sense, (B=G) is superior to the view that backing is primitive simpliciter in terms of ontological
parsimony.
27Versions of this objection can be found in J. Wilson (2016) and Thompson (2018).
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explanations. Myweaker point is that it would be desirable to be able to illuminate grounding in this
additional way (i.e., by appealing to its function to back explanations). In this sense, a character-
ization of grounding in terms of backing qua grounding would be uninformative (albeit, possible).
What about reductive versions of grounding? A promising way of reducing grounding is by
appealing to the set of, whatWilson calls, “small-g” relations (2014). A small-g relation is, roughly, a
determination relation that has a very similar profile to grounding. For example, the relation of
constitution is also said to capture priority-talk and is also taken to be explanatory.
A reductive account of grounding in terms of small-g relations can be articulated in two ways.
The first one would be to say that backing is a form of grounding and grounding is multiply
realizable by different small-g relations (J. Wilson 2014, 567-8; Rettler 2017). In this sense, backing
would be identical to the realized entity which would entail that backing itself is multiply realizable
by small-g relations.28 This option is very implausible. Many paradigmatic small-g relations are not
plausible realizers of backing (e.g., set-formation).
A more promising way of understanding backing as a kind of reduced grounding is by taking
backing to be identical to one of the (potentially many) realizers of grounding. In this sense, (B=G)
would be the view that backing is identical to some small-g relation. Still, it is impossible to assess
this proposal without specifying which small-g relation backing is supposed to be. For this reason,
(B=G) is unilluminating and, at best, only the first step toward an informative definition of backing.
5. Backing as truthmaking
In this section, I propose a new definition of backing. According to (Functional), the backing
relation connects grounding-facts with explanations. Also, explanations, as mentioned in section 2,
are certain kinds of propositions. But what kind of relation connects propositions with grounding-
facts? A very plausible candidate for this role is the truthmaking relation.
(B=T) [A grounds B] backs ‘A explains B,’ iff, ‘A explains B’ is made true by [A grounds B].
(B=T) satisfies all three clauses of (Functional). It is a nontrivial and substantive issue whether a
given worldly fact serves as a truthmaker for a proposition. Also, truthmaking is a cross-categorical
relation par excellence (Tahko 2016). Finally, it is plausible that in order for an explanation to be
successful it is (at least) necessary for that explanation to be true.
What is the nature of the truthmaking relation? According to Armstrong’s (2004) classic picture,
truthmaking is the internal relation of necessitation. As a quick example, take the following
psychophysical explanation:
(M)The fact thatMary hasmental stateM1 is noncausally explained by the fact thatMary has
brain state B1 and that a psychophysical law connecting M-type mental states with B-type
brain states obtains.
What backs (M)? Plausibly, worldly facts such as the relevant psychophysical law partially
grounding the fact that Mary has mental state M1. Adopting Armstrong’s account, this means
thatMary’s brain state B1 together with the relevant psychophysical law necessitate the truth of (M).
On the face of it this seems plausible. Of course, there are well known objections to the view that
truthmaking is the relation of necessitation, which I am not going to rehearse here (MacBride 2020,
sec. 1.2.). Thankfully, (B=T), on its own, takes no particular stance toward the specifics of the
truthmaking relation. In this sense, I intend for my proposal to be minimal. Truthmaking, in this
28I think this is the most promising reductive theory of grounding currently in the literature (hence my focus). Another
option would involve reducing grounding to essences (e.g., Correia and Skiles 2019). I do not have the space to properly discuss
this interesting alternative.
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context, is supposed to designate whichever relation is posited by one’s background truthmaker
theory.
Deferring to one’s background truthmaker theory is dialectically acceptable. Figuring out which
truthmaker theory is the correct one is a substantive philosophical problem that requires our
attention anyway, independently of the discussion around backing, grounding, and the separatism/
unionism debate. In this sense, the fact that the final details of my proposal are “hostage” to one’s
background truthmaker theory is not a significant cost.29
The minimality of (B=T) is worth emphasizing in at least three additional ways. For one,
nothing in (B=T) entails a robust notion of truthmakers. Opponents of truthmaker theory
usually argue that one can make sense of truth being dependent on reality without having to
posit separate entities called “truthmakers.” (B=T) is neutral toward this objection. One is free to
adopt a thin understanding of truthmakers according to which such entities are not separate and
distinct facts but are simply those bits of reality that account for the truth of the relevant
proposition.30
Secondly, there is an ongoing discussion about the level of grain of the truthmaking relation. For
example, some opponents of the correspondence theory of truth argue that a robust understanding
of correspondence (perhaps, as causal regulation) is explanatorily superfluous. Again, (B=T) is
neutral toward this discussion. Following Armstrong, proponents of (B=T) can take the truthmak-
ing relation to be an internal relation without reifying it by appealing to some external determi-
nation relation.
Thirdly, so far, I have been focusing on backing as a relation that holds between explanations and
grounding-facts. But, as mentioned in section 2, there is no reason why backing should be
constrained in this way. Truthmaking, as such, can be used to define diverse metaphysical theses
(from antirealism to realism about a given domain). Analogously, an explanation could be backed
by determination-facts (broadly construed), nomic facts, or facts about essences. But they could also
be backed by facts which are not worldly, at least in the traditional sense. For example, it could turn
out that explanations are true in virtue of the fact that they are appropriately related to other
explanations. In a case like this, such explanations would be backed by the fact that they figure in an
appropriately defined set of explanations.31
Finally, (B=T) is more informative than both construals of (B=G) while staying minimal
toward the details of the truthmaking relation itself and pluralistic concerning the different kinds
of entities that can serve as truthmakers. In this sense, (B=T) could be compatible with (B=G) if
one takes grounding to be reducible and truthmaking to be one of its realizers. Still, such
assumptions are controversial, and I take it that (B=T) has merit independently of its connection
to grounding. This is particularly evident if one considers that skepticism about truthmaking is,
in general, more controversial (and less widespread) than skepticism about grounding. As
mentioned, grounding is a relatively new metaphysical tool whereas my notion of truthmaking
is minimal. Under these considerations, I take it that (B=T) should be the default view
concerning the nature of the backing relation. In the following two sections, I consider two
objections against my view.
29The relevant literature has made a number of proposals concerning the nature of truthmaking. Perhaps, truthmaking is a
version of the supervenience relation (Heil 2016) or, as mentioned, some kind of necessitation (Armstrong 2004). Truthmaking
could also be a version of grounding (cf. footnotes 30 and 34).
30See Rodriguez-Pereya (2005, 24) and MacBride (2014, 378) for the distinction I am appealing to. Truthmaking relations
which do not seem to require a robust ontological category of truthmakers include most traditional correspondence-
relations (e.g., Barnard and Horgan 2006, 29) and deflationary truthmaking (Hornsby 2005). For discussion see Asay and
Baron (2019, 10).
31AsDaly (2005, 97) correctly notes, coherentists about truth can argue that a true proposition is “backed” by the fact that this
proposition is a member of a maximally coherent set of propositions. For the analogous view on explanation, see Kovacs
(2019b).
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6. The inheritance worry
Grounding theorists often appeal to the nature of explanation to justify the fact that grounding has
certain formal features. Grounding is supposed to be irreflexive because explanation is irreflexive
(grounding inherits its formal features from explanation) (Maurin 2019). However, it could be
objected that (B=T) is implausible because the truthmaking relation (in any of its forms) cannot
plausibly fulfill the inheritance function. Specifically, it is implausible that truthbearers have the
same formal features as their truthmakers.
To illustrate, compare truthmaking to relations that plausibly do license inheritance claims. The
identity relation is the most obvious example. If explanations are identical to grounding-facts, then
it follows that they have the same formal features. A less trivial case can be found in the literature on
mental causation. Some philosophers argue that mental states hold in virtue of brain states and,
because of that, the causal profile of the latter is transmitted to the former.32 But backing is neither
the identity relation nor the relation that holds between minds and brains.
There are two ways in which (B=T) can be defended against this. The first strategy involves
directly meeting the challenge by arguing that truthmaking can license inheritance claims. To that
effect, it could be claimed that truthmaking should be understood as an isomorphic relation. More
specifically, truthmaking could be isomorphic in the sense that truthbearers are structurally
identical to their corresponding truthmakers. The proposition that the cat is on the mat involves
a certain relation between its constituents that “mirrors” the structure of the fact that the cat is on
the mat. If this is true, then those explanations that are backed plausibly share the same formal
features with the grounding-facts that back them.
Against this move, it should be noted that knowing about the features of explanation cannot tell
us anything about grounding-facts that do not serve as truthmakers. Looking into the features of
explanation (asymmetry, irreflexivity, etc.) can only serve to illuminate the features of those (and
only those) grounding-facts which back explanations. In this sense, even if one assumes that
truthmaking is isomorphic, this at best provides only limited access to the inner workings of
grounding. Also, the very claim that truthmaking is isomorphic is far from obviously true (Schipper
2020).
So far, I have beenmostly focusing on how explanations relate to their corresponding grounding
or determination-facts. But, as previously mentioned, there is no good reason to restrict backing in
this way. Backing is supposed to be the relation that connects explanations with whichever entity
makes them true. Assuming isomorphism would beg the question against views that allow for
successful explanations to be true but cash out their success holistically (to mention one example).
Such views would say that an explanation of the form ‘A explains B’ is not made true by a
grounding-fact of the form [A grounds B] but by a plurality of different facts that bear no
isomorphic relation to the original explanation.
My preferred strategy involves denying that we should expect to find out about the nature of
grounding by looking at the explanations which grounding-facts back. Grounding should be
examined in the same way every other phenomenon is examined: by hypothesizing and testing
such hypotheses against a background of a well-established body of beliefs. The analogy with
causation is helpful at this point.33 It is uncontroversial that there are causal events which are not
explanatory. Still, there are other ways in which philosophers have proceeded to learn about the
nature of causation. Being able to back causal explanations is one of the roles that causal relations
have. Other roles include, for example, figuring in our best scientific and folk theories. Philosophers,
based on certain folk and scientific platitudes about causation, propose certain hypotheses about
what the causal relation really is (e.g., counterfactual dependence, energy transfer, etc.). At best,
32Such inheritance theses are usually articulated by appealing to functional realization or immanent causation (Robb and
Heil 2021, sec. 6.4).
33For the tight connection between causation and grounding, see Fine (2012), Schaffer (2016), and A. Wilson (2018).
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looking into the nature of causal explanations can be one of themanyways in which we can uncover
the true nature of causation.
7. The regress worry
Recall that one of my worries against (B=E) was that given (Explanation Maximalism), a regress is
generated. (B=T) is supposed to avoid this worry. But it could be plausibly argued that (B=T) also
leads to a regress if one takes truthmaking to be an explanatory relation. If truthmaking is
explanatory, then (B=T) seems to collapse into (B=E). A way to raise this worry is to take
truthmaking to be a form of grounding and then take grounding to be explanatory. But the objector
does not even need to make this move.34 The link between truthmaking and explanation is usually
highlighted in the relevant literature, so I take the claim that truthmaking is explanatory to be well-
motivated independently of whether it is a grounding relation.
What does it mean to say that truthmaking is explanatory? Asay (2017, 10) identifies two
possible answers: either truthmaking is itself an instance of the explanation-relation or explanation
is simply a constraint on truthmaking (i.e., P makes <P> true only if P explains <P>). The first
option is a form of unionism about truthmaking whereas the second is a form of separatism about
truthmaking.
Ruling out the first option seems fairly easy. It is simply bizarre to be a separatist about grounding
and a unionist about truthmaking. Even if one does not take truthmaking to be a form of grounding,
it could still be argued that the two notions are similar enough. So, separatism can be motivated for
both relations on similar grounds.
Is grounding similar to truthmaking? It is not obvious that it is. As previously mentioned, it is
controversial that truthmaking is a form of grounding. Perhaps, as Audi (2019) notes, truthmaking
is not a grounding relation because it should not be understood as a determination relation. But if
that’s the case, then the putative similarity between the two relations becomes thin. Against this, I
propose that separatism about both grounding and truthmaking should be motivated differently.
Rather, separatism is primarily a view about explanation. Successful explanations are certain kinds
of propositions which do not float free. So, insofar as one is a separatist about explanations involving
grounding one should also be a separatist about explanations involving truthmaking. In other
words, separatism about grounding and truthmaking are simply instances of separatism simpliciter.
The second option is trickier. According to this form of separatism, truthmaking and explana-
tion are distinct, but every truthmaking-fact ([P makes <P> true]) has a corresponding explanation
(<P explains <P>>). This version of separatism is different from the kind of separatism I have been
considering so far (call my version, standard separatism). An important and desirable feature of
standard separatism is that grounding-facts can exist in the absence of explanation. In an analogous
sense, separatism about truthmaking should allow for certain truthmaking-facts to exist in the
absence of a corresponding explanation. Does this compromise the well-established link between
truthmaking and explanation? It does not. It can still be said that truthmaking is explanatory even if
it is not the case that every truthmaking-fact figures into an explanation. Causation is also
explanatory by anyone’s lights even though there are clear cases of causal events which are not
involved in causal explanation.
Still, one could wonder whether standard versions of separatism coupled with (B=T) can
successfully deal with the regress worry. Can truthmaking-facts exist in the absence of explanation?
In essence, the answer to this question depends on one’s view about the ontological status of
explanations (i.e., the ontological status of propositions). According to one influential view,
34Especially since cashing out the relation between grounding and truthmaking is controversial (see Liggins 2012; Tahko
2016; Asay 2017). For recent and direct rejections of the thesis that truthmaking is a case of grounding see Griffith (2014), Saenz
(2018), and Audi (2019).
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propositions are reified abstracta that are expressed by particular sentences. Such views take
explanations to be stance independent in the sense that explanations exist independently of whether
they are expressed or conceived by agents. But if that’s the case, then the regress worry looms large
again. Every truthmaking-fact would have a real, stance independent, corresponding explanation.
Such truthmaking-facts (e.g., the fact that [Pmakes <P> true] makes <P explains <P>> true) would,
in turn, have their own corresponding explanations, and so on ad infinitum. So, it seems that (B=T)
faces the same worry as (B=E) in terms of generating regresses.
One thing to immediately notice is that even if we accept that (B=T) generates a regress, the kind
of regress it generates is significantly different from the one (B=E) generates. (B=E) coupled with
the thesis that every explanation is backed entails that every explanation is explained. This means
that if an explanation exists, then an infinite series of explanations is generated. Under closer
inspection, this is a regress that runs “downward.” A second-order explanation is more
“fundamental” than the explanation it explains (in the sense that first-order explanations depend
on second-order explanation, second-order explanations depend on third-order explanations, and
so on ad infinitum). This means that the infinite regress (B=E) generates runs toward the
fundamental level. (B=T), on the other hand, leads to an “upward” regress. In this case, the first
element of the series is a truthmaking-fact which, in turn, gives rise to another truthmaking-fact,
and so on ad infinitum. This means that the order of dependence goes from a truthmaking-fact
(of the form [P makes <P> true]) toward its corresponding “meta” truthmaking-fact (of the form
[[P makes <P> true] makes <P makes <P> true> true]). This is a significant difference because
upward regresses are generally regarded as less problematic than downward regresses (Cameron
2008).
Still, it should be noted that there is a way for the separatist to deny that (B=T) generates a regress
altogether. Specifically, the separatist should deny that propositions exist stance independently.35
Notice that if the existence of explanations directly depends on the deliberation of conscious agents,
then there will not be an infinite series of explanations unless an agent can generate one. If a
truthmaking-fact makes its corresponding explanation true, this presupposes that that explanation
exists. The demand for a truthmaker arises only once the relevant proposition is formed. But
according to the view I am considering, whether an explanation is formed depends on the relevant
agents and their explanatory demands. To compare, (B=E) faces a regress worry that cannot be
avoided using similarmeans. It is independently plausible that every successful explanation requires
a backer. (B=T) can meet that demand: explanations, insofar as they are formed, require truth-
makers. Rather, the proponent of (B=T) should deny the converse thesis, namely, that every
truthmaker has a corresponding explanation.36
I do not have the space to fully defend a stance-dependent view about the existence of
propositions. Still, it suffices to say that such a view is both powerful and already assumed by
many philosophers working on explanation. Kim (1988), for example, adopts a view of propo-
sitions akin to contemporary conceptualist theories (i.e., propositions as abstractions of
mental tokenings) (King 2007).37 The alternative would be to understand propositions as entities
35It could be objected that my solution is plausible insofar as explanations are propositions. But what if they are physical
structures representing some phenomenon (say, two rocks representing the sun and the moon)? Surely, the rocks would
continue to exist even in the absence of an explanation involving them. It is certainly possible to construe explanations in this
way. But, sticking to the framework that explanations are propositions (entailing that the existence of that explanation is
nothing over and above the existence of that proposition), it could be said that such physical systems illustrate or express the
content of the relevant explanation (without being, themselves, explanations).
36This alsomeans that A grounding B is compatible with there being an explanatory gap betweenA and B (see J.Wilson 2016,
11). The fact that A grounds B does not entail, on its own, that A explains B.
37Philosophers adopting similar views include Armstrong (1997), Wright (2012, 375–76, 376), Koslicki (2012, 212–13),
Wright and van Eck (2018, 1005). One can also trace this line of thinking in the literature on scientific representation (Giere
2010).
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whose existence-conditions are completely independent of human agency. But such views are
notorious for their inability to explain how they get their truth-conditions and their represen-
tational capacities. In comparison, the agent-dependent view has a clear-cut explanation: prop-
ositions get their truth-conditions and their ability to represent in virtue of the capacities of
conscious agents.
There are ways to resist these points, but it should be noted that whichever way the relevant
dialectic plays out, at least as far as regresses are concerned, (B=T) is superior to (B=E). If (B=T)
generates a regress, then it is a regress that is more palatable than the one (B=E) generates. Finally, I
have highlighted a plausible, albeit not completely nonparochial, way for the proponent of standard
separatism to completely bypass the regress worry.
A final point about (B=T) and regresses. I have argued that (B=E) leads to a downward regress,
whereas (B=T) leads to an upward one. But it could be argued that (B=T) leads to a downward
regress as well. After all, we can still ask: What explains why [A grounds B] makes ‘A explains B’
true? And, then, we can ask what explains that further truthmaking-fact ad infinitum. In this sense,
(B=T) might not be superior to (B=E) in that regard after all.
Note that in order for (B=T) to generate a regress in the above sense, (B=T) needs to be coupled
with the two following triggering statements:38
(1) Every truthmaking-fact has a ground.
(2) Every grounding-fact involving a truthmaking-fact (of the form “P grounds the fact that Q
makes <Q> true”) has a corresponding explanation (of the form “P explains the fact that Q
makes <Q> true”).
Both statements can be contested. (2) presumably follows from the principle that determination-
facts always have explanations which they back. But I have already indicated that an attractive
version of separatism would want to accept the possibility of determination-facts occurring in the
absence of explanation. I also proposed a plausible way to deliver this result by taking propositions
to be stance-independent entities.
(1) can also be resisted. Even if some truthmaking-facts have grounds, it is not obvious that this
should apply to every truthmaking-fact. For all we know, some truthmaking-facts might be brute or
fundamental. Perhaps (1) can be motivated by appealing to a principle of sufficient reason
according to which everything has a ground. Compare with (B=E). The triggering statement that
(B=E) needs to be coupled with is, as noted, simply a plausible version of separatism: “Every
successful explanation is backed.” But, surely, that principle is much less controversial than the
principle that everything has a ground.
Separatism coupled with (B=T) entails that every successful explanation has a truthmaker,
whereas separatism coupled with (B=E) entails that every successful explanation needs to be
explained (which results in a regress). For this reason, the downward regress problem is avoided
by (B=T) and is particularly pressing for the proponent of (B=E).39
38A triggering statement is a statement that ensures that the relevant series of elements will not have a last member (Maurin
2013).
39It is also not so clear whether (B=T) coupled with (1) and (2) generates a downward instead of an upward regress (the latter
of which, as noted, is generally understood as less controversial). The proposed regress runs as follows. First, a truthmaking-fact
(TM) is grounded by some ground (G). Then, a grounding-fact of the form [G grounds TM] is formed. Then, that grounding-
fact makes its corresponding explanation true. Then, that truthmaking-fact has a further ground, and so on ad infinitum. But
the dependencies involved in this regress run in multiple directions. The first element of the series (TM) depends on the second
element (G). But, then, the emerging grounding-fact gives rises to its corresponding explanation (which, in turn, depends on a
further ground, and so on). To compare, on a paradigmatic downward regress the first element depends on the second element,
which depends on the third element ad infinitum. So, even if one brackets the worries that I raised against (1) and (2), the
resulting regress is not paradigmatically downward.
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8. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to argue that instances of backing are instances of truthmaking. I examined
and rejected two prominent proposals: backing as explaining and backing as grounding. Then I
proposed that backing should be understood as an instance of truthmaking. I also understood
truthmakingminimally. Finally, I responded to two objections against my proposal: the inheritance
worry and the regress worry.
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